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Abstract
The paper explores a consumer search setting where the sellers have asymme-
tries. The model is an extension of the popular Stahl Model, which is widely used in
the literature. The extension introduces sellers with heterogeneous stores number,
reflecting the typical market structure. The market consists of several sellers hetero-
geneous in size consumers, some of which face a cost when sequentially searching.
The paper shows that no symmetric model exist in the extension and asymmetric
NE of the Stahl model are found for comparison. Additional results suggest that
smallest sellers will be the ones offering lowest prices, in line with several real world
examples provided in the paper. However, profits remain in most cases fixed per
store, making a larger firm more profitable, yet with lower sold quantity. The find-
ings suggest that on some level price dispersion will still exist, together with some
level of price stickiness, both observed in reality.
Keywords: Sequential Consumer Search, Oligopoly, Asymmetric NE
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D83, L13.
1 Introduction
Empirical studies, such as [2] or [19], have established that significant price dispersion
exists even for homogeneous goods. As the literature suggests, this effect is observed in
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many market structures and is persistent. One of the explanations for this phenomenon
is that consumers search for the cheapest price. Since searching is costly, consumers may
settle down for a slightly higher price. In the literature many papers deal with search
models, for example [7], [12], [21] and [23]. These models were developed originally in
order to provide a solution to the Diamond Paradox [13], which predicted a complete
market failure. The search models vary in the scope, the length, the stopping condition
or the information revealed during the consumer search. Additional Empiric studies,
for example [16], reveal that the model introduced by Stahl in [21] perform very well
and predicts correctly the pricing model of 86 out of 87 tested products. Moreover,
[5] empirically shows the existence of the two consumer types predicted by this model.
Therefore, this paper will concentrate on the Stahl search model.
An additional Phenomenon that can be observed, for example in [2], is a possible correla-
tion between the price offered by a seller and the number of stores she has. Namely, the
more branches a seller has the higher will be the price offered. Despite the fact that the
Stahl Model has a variety of extensions, the literature dealing with asymmetries among
sellers is not large. This is a very important extension, as in the real world the number of
stores a seller has can vary, for example - see figure 1. Among the few papers in this field
is [1], where only a model with 2 sellers is concerned. This paper shows several effects,
which appear only when there are at least three sellers available. An additional paper is
[8], where only a single large firm exists and all other are single store sellers. Already there
it is noted that the larger firm charges a higher price. This paper investigates whether
this is true in a more general setting than in [8]. Here the Stahl model is extended, and
each seller has a predefined, seller specific store number. The seller sets the same price
for all stores (e.g.: Bank offers for saving accounts). The consumers search sequentially
and uniformly among stores, rather than sellers. This implies that there is more chance
for a consumer to turn up at a store belonging to the larger seller. Additionally, if a
searcher is unsatisfied with a price, she would refrain from visiting any additional store of
the previously visited seller.
The results overview is as follows:
1. Description of the asymmetric NE of the Stahl model
2. Formal introduction of an extension to the Stahl model, dealing with heterogeneous
sellers
3. Description of the NE in the extended model, when the smallest seller is not unique
4. Description of the NE in the extended model, when the smallest seller unique
5. Examples for NE which illustrate each of the three cases
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Figure 1: Number of discounter stores in Munich, according to kaufda.de, 5.2011
The first thing one notice when discussing the extended Stahl model (with different size
sellers) is a lack of a symmetric equilibrium, where all sellers use the same strategy.
The original Stahl model has a unique symmetric Equilibrium, as shown in [21] and the
literature does not goes far beyond it. In order to provide an important building block for
the extended Stahl model this paper first analyzes the asymmetric equilibria the original
model has. For comparison, in another search model introduced in [23], it is shown in [3]
that there are asymmetric equilibria, but those can be ignored. In the Stahl model there
might be additional equilibria when different settings are considered. For example, it is
shown in [6] that one can receive additional equilibria in commonly known games, when
the scope is broadened. This paper finds a family of asymmetric equilibria to the original
model, where strategies are of (at most) three types - some sellers (at least two) mix over
the entire available price interval with a seller invariant distribution, whereas the second
group (might be empty) selects the reserve price as a pure strategy. The third group
(might be empty) has a pricing distribution which consists of a mass point at the reserve
price, and use the same distribution as the first group up to a seller specific cutoff price.
As for the extended model, the paper shows that when there are at least two smallest
sellers, all sellers except the smallest sellers select the reserve price purely. The remaining
sellers have a similar equilibrium to the original Stahl model, but with a lower portion
of uninformed consumers (all those who visit one of the smallest sellers). This extends
the result in [8], and shows that the lowest price will be obtained in one of the smaller
chains. Moreover, in all equilibria found here (in both the original and extended models)
all sellers have the same expected profit per store, all consumers buy at the first store they
visit and no seller will ever set a price above the reserve price. Additional characteristic
of the NE is that in the original model the expected profit for is equal for all sellers, and
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in the extended model, in most cases, the profit is a constant times the chain size (store
number).
In case of a single smallest firm the equilibrium structure slightly changes. Now, it is the
smallest and ’second smallest sellers’ (the ones with the smallest share except the smallest
seller) who mixes over the entire interval. Second smallest sellers have a mass point at
the reserve price, and in addition select one of the three familiar possibilities - mix over
entire interval, cutoff price or reserve price purely. Note that at least one of the second
smallest seller mixes. All other sellers select the reserve price purely. Note that here the
smallest seller has larger profit per store than all other sellers, and all sellers but her have
equal, lower, profit per store (in all other cases the profit per store is equal for all sellers).
The structure is similar to the extended model with two or more smallest firms, where
the second smallest sellers behave similarly to the smallest sellers. This change is in line
to the simple model suggested by [1], in a model with two different sized sellers.
The Stahl model is dealt extensively in the literature, and is a a very popular model.
Numerous extension to the Stahl Model were introduced, and the various extensions are
dealing with nearly every aspect of the model. Among those are introducing heterogeneous
searchers. Example for such extensions are [9] and [22], where the searchers have different
cost for each additional store they visit. They can differ by the search scope, as discussed
in [1], where some stores are near, and thus will be searched first. Another extension
introduced advertisement costs, as discussed, for example by [10]. There are also models
where already the first price is costly, such as [15], or no possibility to freely return to
previously visited store, such as [17]. The literature has discussion regarding the sequential
search in the model and looks also at non-sequential search, for example in [14], or the
unknown production cost as shown in [18]. Most assumptions of the model introduced
by Stahl in [21] are discussed extensively, except one main assumption, used extensively
in the literature. This is the focus on symmetric equilibria, where all sellers select an
identical strategy. One of reasons is the mathematical complexity: [12] and [20] showed
that in symmetric equilibria consumer reserve price must exist, and in asymmetric ones it
may not. Reserve price assumption is common in the literature, and therefore, the paper
considers only NE with reserve price, yet justifies the rationality behind it. Nevertheless,
one should note that additional Equilibria without reserve price may exist, and fall beyond
the scope of this paper.
An additional outcome of this model can explain price stickiness, as described for example
in [11]. Many equilibria found here have mass points on certain prices. This implies that
with some probability the price in the previous round can be the same also in the next
round, even though the seller is mixing. In reality it is known that that prices do not
change too often and are sticky. The results of this model can provide an insight on why
it is so, as prices selected with mass points can remain unchanged during several periods.
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The structure of the paper is as follows: first the original Stahl model is formally shown and
knowledge and structure of the game are discussed. Then I turn to look at asymmetric
NE of the original model. Afterward I introduce the extended model and discuss the
differences between the models to clarify the nature of the extension. Then I will provide
the results to the extended model, firstly in the case with several smallest firms and
then with a unique smallest firm. Then the implications of the results are discussed, and
suggestions on how those results can be empirically tested.
2 Model
The Stahl model, as introduced in [21] is formally described below. Notation was adjusted
to the recent literature on the Stahl model.
There are N sellers, selling an identical good. Each seller owns a single store. The
production cost is normalized to 0, and assume that the seller can meet the demand.
Additionally, there are buyers, each of whom wishes to buy a unit of the good. The mass
of buyers is normalized to 1. This implies that there are many small buyers, each of which
is strategically insignificant.
The sellers are identical, and set their price once at the first stage of the game. If the
seller mixes then the distribution is selected simultaneously, and only at a later stage the
realizations take place.
The buyers are of two types. A fraction µ of buyers are shoppers, who know where the
cheapest price is, and they buy at the cheapest store. In case of a draw they randomize
uniformly over all cheapest stores, spreading equally among the cheapest stores. The rest
are searchers, who sample prices. Sampling price in the first, randomly and uniformly
selected, store is free. It is shown in [15] that if it is not the case then some searchers
would avoid purchase. If the price there is satisfactory - the searcher will buy there.
However, if the price is not satisfactory - the searcher will go on to search, sequentially,
in additional stores, where each additional search has a cost c. The second (or any later)
store is randomly and uniformly selected from the previously unvisited stores, and the
searcher may be satisfied, or search further on. When a searcher is satisfied, she has a
perfect and free recall. This implies she will buy the item at the cheapest store she had
encountered, randomizing uniformly in case of a draw.
There is a developing literature where the sellers are asymmetric, such as [1]. The main
difference in the extension is that the distribution of searchers among stores is not uniform,
but a different one. In this section I concentrate on the case where the sellers are identical,
and they can choose different pricing strategies. This extension is addressed in later
sections, where the distribution of searchers among stores would be more generic.
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The buyers need to be at both types (namely, 0 < µ < 1). If there are only shoppers
- it is the Bertrand competition setting [6], and if there are only searchers the Diamond
Paradox [13] is encountered, both well studied.
Before going on, make some technical assumptions on the model are introduced, the
rationality behind them is explained. The assumptions are as follows:
• Throughout this paper it is assumed that the sellers cannot offer a price above some
finite bound M . This has the interpretation of being the maximal valuation of a
buyer for the good.
• Throughout this paper, it is also assumed that searchers accept any price below c.
The logic behind it is any price below my further search cost will be accepted, as it
is not possible to reduce the cost by searching further.
• To avoid measure theory problems it is assumed that mixing is possible by setting
mass points or by selecting distribution over full measure dense subsets of intervals.
2.1 Reserve Price and Knowledge
In the symmetric Stahl model the consumers have a reserve price in NE. The reserve price
determines the behavior of consumers - the searcher is satisfied and searches no further if
and only if the price is (weakly) below her reserve price, unless all stores are visited. If the
price is below the reserve price - the search stops and the consumer purchases the good, if
not - the search will continue. If all prices are above the reserve price - the cheapest store
will be selected, after searching in all stores. In order to maintain in one line with the
vast literature of the model, and being able to compare the results reserve price existence
is assumed. However, one needs to specify when and how the reserve price is determined.
The reserve price is determined simultaneously to the price strategy choice of the sellers
the searchers set a reserve price. The reserve price is identical to all searchers, as was also
in the original model. It will be denoted throughout the paper as PM . How the reserved
price is determined is dealt with below.
Below is the setting that allows searching, as difference in prices can provide incentives to
it. Moreover, it extends the symmetric Stahl model knowledge available to the searchers,
as the reserve price is c above the expected price of a seller. There, they knew the mixed
strategy chosen by the sellers, and their behavior (whether to search further or not) was
adjusted accordingly. Here, as the strategies of the sellers do not have to be identical, a
price observed implies something on prices not observed yet. After observing price p in a
store, the searcher can estimate the probability that the strategy of the seller is a specific
one, and from that induce the expected price in other stores. Therefore, it is important
to introduce beliefs and explain how exactly these are adjusted while searching.
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The searchers have beliefs regarding the prices set. For each possible (pure and mixed)
strategy s of the model is attached a belief, stating how many sellers are actually using
this strategy n(s) (clearly the sum of n(s) is n, the number of stores). Each strategy has
an expected price, denoted e(s). Now, it is easy to explain how the searcher will determine
whether she searches on or not.
Suppose the searcher observed the price p. Let us denote the probability that this price
p came from strategy s as prob(p, s). For this the searcher calculates chance that s is
selected by some seller and the probability that p is the realization of strategy s (relevant
for mixed strategies). One needs to note that if some strategies (with positive n(s)) have
a mass point on p only those will be considered, and if there are no mass points on p the
densities will play a role. Formally:
prob(p, s) =
n(s)f(s)∑
p∈s′ n(s
′)p(s′)
(1)
Now, if the searcher thinks that strategy s was selected, searching further will yield (in
expected terms) the expected price in all the other stores. Therefore, it is the expected
price, only that n(s) is now one lower (as s was observed in one of the stores). If n(s) ≤ 1
s will be simply omitted from further calculations:∑
s′:n(s′)>0,s′ 6=s n(s
′)e(s′) + (n(s)− 1)e(s)∑′
s n(s
′)
(2)
Remark 2.1 In the extended model instead of the number of sellers with the relevant
strategy the belief will state the number of stores with the relevant strategy.
Searchers search further only when the expected price in a search is at least c lower than
the lowest observed price. Below is an example of how to calculate an expected search
price, and additionally illustrates that no reserve price may exist:
Example 2.1 Suppose the search cost c is 0.9 and pricing strategies, equally probable
from the beliefs of a searcher, are as follows:
1. Uniform in [1, 9], Exp. value of 5
2. Uniform in [5, 9], Exp. value of 7
3. Pure strategy of 7.
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After observing the price of 7 one is certain with prob. 1 that she had encountered the
third strategy seller. An additional search will yield the average between the expected
values of the two strategies - namely - 6, making a search worthy.
After observing the price of 7 + ε One knows that she had encountered one of the mixed
strategies, and due to a likelihood ratio - twice more probable that it is the second strategy.
Therefore, with probability 1/3 it is the first str. and probability 2/3 the second str.
If the first strategy was encountered, then an additional search will end up in ether second
or third strategy - both with expected price of 7.
If it is the second strategy, then an additional search will end up with expected price of
5 or of 7, as both can occur with equal probability (due to the beliefs) expected price in
an additional search in this case is 6.
Combining the two possibilities, when taking into account that the second case is twice
more probable, the expected price in an additional search is (2 · 6+ 7)/3 = 6.333, making
another search not profitable.
Here one sees the problematic assumption of the reserve price - it might be the case that it
does not exist. However, in order to maintain in one line with the literature I concentrate
on NE with a reserve price. Therefore, when one has a suspected a profile to be a NE
one still needs to check whether the searchers there behave rationally, when adopting a
reserve price. Later some lemmas will be provided which will help in determining the
reserve price condition. Therefore, the set of all possible NE may be wider, as some NE
without a reserve price may exist.
Definition 2.1 As the beliefs are on the sellers disregarding their identity, we will refer
to this belief setting as ’Anonymous Knowledge’.
2.2 Game Structure
The game is played between the sellers, searchers and the shoppers. The time line of the
game is as follows:
1. Sellers select pricing strategies and consumers set reserve price.
2. Realizations of prices occur for sellers with mixed strategies.
3. Shoppers go and purchase the item at the cheapest store
4. Searchers select a store and observe the price in the store
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5. If the price observed is weakly below PM the searcher is satisfied and purchases the
item, if not the search continues
6. All unsatisfied searches select one additional store, pay c and sample the price there.
7. If the price observed is below PM the searcher is satisfied and purchases the item, if
not the search continues
8. ...
9. When the seller observed all stores and observed only prices above PM she would
buy at the cheapest store encountered.
At the time the reserve price and the strategies are determined the knowledge of the
various agents of the game is as follows:
• The sellers are aware of the reserve price set by the searchers
• The searchers have beliefs about which strategies were actually played by the sellers
(see subsection 2.1).
• The shoppers will know the real price in each store in the moment it is realized.
The probability that seller i sells to the shoppers when offering price p is denoted αi(p).
Let q be defined as the expected quantity that seller i sells when offering price p. The
expected quantity sold by the seller consists of the expected share of searchers that will
purchase at her store, plus the probability she is the cheapest store multiplied by the
fraction of shoppers, and is also the market share of the seller (shoppers + searchers mass
is normalized to 1).
Note that the reserve price ensures that the searcher will purchase at the last visited store,
unless all stores were searched.
The utilities of the game are as follows:
• The seller utility is the price charged multiplied by the expected quantity sold.
• The consumer utility is a large constant M , from which the price paid for the item
and the search costs are subtracted.
The NE of the game, under our assumptions, is as follows:
• Searchers have a reserve price.
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• The searchers beliefs coincide with the actual strategies played.
• The reserve price is rational for the searchers, according to ’Anonymous Knowledge’.
• No seller can unilaterally adjust the pricing strategy and gain profit in expected
terms.
Remark 2.2 As the sum of the searcher and seller utilities may differ only in the search
cost, any strategy profile where the searchers always purchase the item at the first store
visited is socially optimal.
2.3 Results
Before stating out the main results of the original model, a number of definitions is
required. The reserve price is denoted as PM . Additionally, a specific price denoted as
PL, and it is the price solving the following equation:
PL(µ+
1− µ
n
) = PM
1− µ
n
PL = PM
1− µ
(n− 1)µ+ 1
If the support of seller i strategy is a positive measure interval from PL to some price
pi < PM , and in addition mass point at PM , it will be said that seller i has a cutoff price
of pi.
Now it is possible to describe the NE of the Stahl model:
Theorem 1 In any NE of the Stahl model with a reserve price there are at most three
groups of strategies, as follows:
1. At least two sellers who have the full support of [PL, PM ] with some NE dependent
continuous full support distr. function F .
2. A group of sellers (possibly empty) that select PM as a pure strategy
3. A group of sellers (possibly empty) with an individual cutoff price, such that below
the cutoff price the distribution used is the same F as from the first group.
Additionally, all sellers have the same profit of PM(1− µ)/n.
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Figure 2: The three types of strategies available in a NE of the extended model
Remark 2.3 For any combination where the third group is empty and the first group has
at least two sellers exists a corresponding NE. Moreover, the sellers have the same expected
profit of PM
1−µ
n
and the searchers buy at the first store they visit. To see this simply adjust
the shoppers share to reflect the game when only searchers visiting the mixing sellers exist.
Illustration of the three types of strategies can be seen on figure 2.
The proof will be provided in the appendix. However, the first step is required to under-
stand certain results on the extended model. Therefore, it is provided below with a short
proof. Several examples will be provided in a later section.
Before continuing I wish to provide some very basic, yet important insights, valid also for
the extended model:
Remark 2.4 As noted already in [21], due to undercutting no pure NE exist. This is
true for the extended model too for the same reasoning.
Lemma 2.1 In both models, no seller offers a price above PM in NE.
Let p be the highest (or supremum) price offered in NE, and p > Pm. Such supremum
exists as it is assumed that there is a finite bound on the prices. Let me distinguish
between several cases:
• A unique mass point at p implies profit 0 to the seller offering it. Searchers would go
on searching and find something cheaper, whereas shoppers would buy at a cheaper
price w.p. 1. A deviation to offer the price c would be a profitable one.
• No mass points at price p implies profit 0 to all offering it. In case of a supremum
price - profit is arbitrarily close to 0. In such case deviation to c is profitable.
• Some (but not all) offer price p with a mass point. The same case as with a single
mass point: the searcher would go on searching until she finds a price cheaper than
p.
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• All sellers offer p with a mass point - undercutting is profitable. With some positive
probability (that all offer price p) you would get all the market instead of just 1/n
of it.
To sum it up - for a seller offering a price p > PM there is a profitable deviation in all
cases. ✷
Corollary 2.1 Any NE is socially optimal, whether in the original or the extended model.
This is since the total utilities of the sellers and consumers sums up to a constant, as long
as the searchers buy at the first store they visit.
I now show a lemma which will assist in determining the reserve price condition for the
searchers:
Lemma 2.2 Suppose that in a NE every seller has the expected price of at least PM − c.
Then setting PM as a reserve price is rational for the searchers.
It is not possible to observe a price above PM , therefore, the searcher always stops search-
ing after the first store visited. It is still required to show that after the first price observed
it is not rational for the searcher to continue searching.
Suppose a price q was observed. As q ≤ PM it is required to show that an expected price
in a search is at least q − c. As the expected price in a search is a convex combination
of some of the expected prices of sellers it is larger than a lower bound on such expected
values. The lower bound on these expected values is PM − c. Therefore, the expected
price obtained in an additional store is at least PM − c > q − c, making an additional
search unprofitable. ✷
Note that the condition here is only a sufficient one, and it might be the case that addi-
tional reserve prices may be rational for searchers. Therefore, the asymmetric NE found
here may do not cover all the possible NE of the model.
2.4 Equilibrium Distribution
Now it is possible to elaborate on the structure of the F function which is used in equilib-
rium by sellers, and what reserve price can be used. Suppose that in equilibrium we have
O = {1, 2, . . . o} sellers with orange strategy (mixing over entire support), B sellers with
blue strategy (pure reserve price) and G = {1, 2, . . . g} sellers with green strategy (cutoff
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price strategy), with the cutoff prices of cp1, cp2, . . . cpg and mass points at the reserve
price are with mass of a1, a2, . . . ag.
Let us denote the set of sellers with cutoff point below some price p as B(p).
From the structure of the equilibrium all sellers have equal profit. Additionally, all sellers
have PM in support and the reserve price attracts no shoppers. Therefore, the profit for
all sellers is:
pi = PM(1− µ)/n (3)
For any price p the expected profit needs to be equal to the expression above. At price
p seller i has a certain probability αi(p) to attract shoppers, if she is the cheapest. This
can be calculated as follows:
• For each seller j 6= i, calculate the probability that j offers a price above p
• Multiply these probabilities
Let p be a price in (PL, PM). For group O this probability is clear and equal to 1− F (p).
For group B - it is zero. For group G we need to distinguish between two cases: ether
p ∈ B(p) and the probability is 1−F (p), or p 6∈ B(p) and then it is equal a(p). Combining
the cases we get that the expression for the expected profit is as follows:
pi = PM(1− µ)/N = p[(1− µ)/n+ µ(
∏
j∈O∪B(p)
(1− F (p))
∏
j∈G\B(p)
(aj))] (4)
As the F function is the same we can simplify and get:
p[(1− µ)/n+ µ((1− F (p))o+|B(p)|
∏
j∈G\B(p)
(1− aj))] = PM(1− µ)/n (5)
Extracting F (p) form this equation will yield:
F (p) = o+|B(p)|
√
1− (
PM
p
− 1)
1− µ
n
∏
j∈G\B(p)(aj)
(6)
Note that at the point of the cutoff price aj(p) = 1 − F (p), and therefore F will be
continuous, and as a certain expression instead of decreasing remains constant will also
be differentiable. Therefore, it is still possible to calculate the density and expected value
regularly. The last step, based on lemma 2.2, require finding the expected value E(F ),
and setting the reserve price at E(F ) + v. As this step is technical and the expressions
involved are complex, this step is not done here for the general case. At the section with
examples specific cases are provided.
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3 Extended Model
In order to deal with heterogeneous firms an extension to the model is required. Instead
of a single store, seller may have several stores, which can vary among sellers. This makes
searching uniformly random among stores and it is no longer uniformly random among
sellers.
The extension of the model is very simple. The searchers do not spread uniformly over
the stores, but according to some given propensities. Seller i has ni stores of the available
N stores, and the searchers are distributed according to this number. Note that it would
be more convenient to think in the extended model of sellers as store chains, with various
number of stores.
This makes the fraction of searchers initially visiting seller i equal to ni
N
instead of 1/n.
Further search is also done according to the propensities, and the probability to visit seller
i is ni divided by the sum of the ni’s of previously unvisited stores.
The section describing the model remains the same, except the following points: ’uniform’
should be changed to ’according to the propensities ni’. An additional difference is that
after visiting and being unsatisfied with a single store of a given seller the searcher would
not return to visit another store of the same seller. The values of ni are common knowledge
among sellers. Once a store is visited the size of the store is revealed to the searcher.
Searchers beliefs are as follows: for any possible strategy s the searchers have belief on
how many stores applied this pricing strategy (see also section 2.1. Store number of the
sellers remains unknown to searchers.
One technical assumption I make trough this section is that the smallest firm (the one
with the smallest number of stores) is not unique. The case with a unique smallest firm
will be dealt in the next section.
Let the smallest value of the size parameter be denoted as nm.
3.1 Difference between Models
The main point of the extension is to catch the fact depicted in figure 1. Heterogeneous
sellers have different number of stores, and due to advertising keep the price fixed in all of
the stores of a given seller. This is not always the case, as some goods do not have to be
fixed over all stores of a seller. Therefore, one needs a distinction between store goods,
that each store set the prices individually, and chain goods which have a fixed price in
all chains stores.
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A good example for the distinction can be understood via two examples for a seller - a
bank and a fuel station. Typically all offers of a given bank do not vary among branches.
One would get the same offers for a mortgage, credit, interest rate for deposits and other
banking products no matter the specific branch of the bank one approaches. Clearly, a
different bank would make different offers, but usually it is the case that a specific branch
of a bank ’X’ on street ’A’ would have the same offers as the branch of bank ’X’ in street
’B’. When one looks at fuel stations, one sees the exact opposite. Every single fuel station
offers station-specific prices, and it is usually the case that fuel station of firm ’Y’ on street
’A’ would have a different price than a fuel station of the same firm ’Y’ on street ’B’.
For the fuel station example, the original Stahl model would suffice, as there being un-
satisfied with a specific station does not imply avoiding the seller completely. However,
if after visiting one branch of bank ’X’ one does not find a satisfactory offer, there is no
reason to visit yet another branch of the same bank. Therefore, present here are both
aspects of the extension - the probability to encounter each seller is proportional to the
number of stores the seller has and the fact that at most a single store of a given seller
would be visited by a given searcher.
Remark 3.1 To emphasize the difference I will refer to the models as ’original’ and
’extended’.
3.2 Results
First, a proof for the fact that no symmetric NE exists in the extended model is provided.
This result is valid also for the next section, when smallest seller is unique.
Lemma 3.1 In the extended model no symmetric NE (where all sellers choose the same
pricing str.) exists.
As before I concentrate only on NE with a reserve price, denoted PM . Due to undercutting
no pure NE can exist. Suppose that exists a mixed strategy symmetric NE. Let the pricing
strategy in the symmetric NE be denoted as s, and let F be the distribution function
describing the pricing strategy s.
As noted before, no seller sets a price above PM , as in such case the highest price in the
support yields profit 0.
Suppose that two prices p and q are in the support of s with positive density or mass
point. Additionally, exist two sellers i, j such that ni > nj.
15
Note that due to symmetry of the strategy choice, the probability of a seller to attract
shoppers with price p is equal to (1−F (p))n−1. The next step is to write down the profits
of seller i, for both prices. Those need to be equal, as mixing is possible only between
prices that yield the same expected profit:
pii(p) = p[(1− F (p))
n−1µ+ (1− µ)ni/N ] = q[(1− F (q))
n−1µ+ ni] = pii(q) (7)
This contains the expected quantity sold by the seller: prob. to be cheapest times the
quantity of shoppers and the quantity of the searchers, which contain only the initial
searchers visiting the store (due to lemma 2.1).
Similarly, the profit of seller j is as follows:
pij(p) = p[(1−F (p))
n−1µ+(1−µ)nj/N ] = q[(1−F (q))
n−1µ+ (1−µ)nj/N ] = pij(q) (8)
After subtracting the second equation from the first one obtains the following:
p[ni − nj ] = q[ni − nj ] (9)
From here, ether p = q or ni = nj, both cannot occur due to our assumptions. ✷
Then one may ask are there any NE, and if so, how do they look like. The following
theorem provides an answer to that question:
Theorem 2 In the extended Stahl Model, with at least two firms, the asymmetric NE
with reserve price PM must have the following form:
• All the sellers who have a larger number of stores than nm select the reserve price
as a pure strategy.
• The agents with nm need to choose their strategies according to theorem 1, where all
shoppers and only the searchers visiting initially one of the smallest firms take part.
• Profit of seller i is Const · ni.
• Searchers buy at the first store they visit
In any NE the searchers visiting one of the larger sellers will observe the reserve price. The
sellers with the smallest chains, the shoppers and the remaining searchers will then play
the original Stahl model. An equilibrium of this game will determine the prices offered
by the smallest sellers.
Illustrating the various consumers of the game is depicted on figure 3.
As the distribution function involves only firms with equal size, the calculations required
are identical to the ones done for the original model in subsection 2.4.
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Figure 3: Consumers and their initial visit
4 Unique Smallest Firm
So far in the extended model the case where the smallest firm was unique was omitted.
This case is dealt here. In this structure exist NE, however these slightly differ in structure
from the previous one. In [1] Stahl model with two different sized sellers is discussed, but
in a more general setting and more sellers. The NE below stands in line with two sellers
behave according to the results in [1], while the rest offer the reserve price purely.
Let the smallest seller be denoted as m and (one of) the second smallest seller as j, with
corresponding store numbers nm and nj. Additionally the shares of consumers that would
visit seller i as searchers (note lemma 2.1) are denoted as follows:
Srci =
ni
N
(1− µ) (10)
Proposition 4.1 Exists a NE with a reserve price PM such that:
1. All sellers except m and j select PM purely.
2. The lowest price in support is PL = PM(
Srcj
µ+Srcj
).
3. m and j mix on the entire interval (PL, PM).
4. The distributions are as provided below, and j has a mass point at PM .
Fm(p) = 1−
Srcj
µ
(
PM
p
− 1) (11)
Fj(p) = (1−
PL
p
)(1 +
Srcm
µ
) (12)
PM =
c
1− ln(
Srcj+µ
Srcj
) ·
Srcj
µ
(13)
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Proof:
Note that from the construction of PM it is clear that it is above c.
First see that there is no deviation to m and j:
It is easy to verify that there is a constant profit for sellers m and j in the interval, since:
pim(p) = ((1− Fj(p))µ+ Srcm) (14)
pij(p) = ((1− Fm(p))µ+ Srcj) (15)
Offering prices below PL is not profitable, as already in PL one attracts the shoppers
w.p.1. Prices above PM will not be offered due to lemma 2.1. Therefore, m and j have
no profitable deviation.
Seller k who is not m or j would similarly refrain form selecting prices below PL or above
PM . Deviating to a price p ∈ (PL, PM) would yield the following profit:
pik(p) = p((1− Fm(p))(1− Fj(p))µ+ Srck) <
p((1− Fm(p))µ) + p(Srck)
Seller j has price p in support and therefore:
pij = p((1− Fm(p))µ) = (PM − p)Srcj (16)
Combining the equations, the following expression is obtained:
pik(p) < (Pm − p)Srcj + pSrck (17)
Note that the size of k is at least the size of j, implying that Srck ≥ Srcj. Therefore, the
profit of seller k when offering price p ∈ (PL, PM) is below PMSrck. However, this profit
is obtained by k when offering PM , and therefore, has no profitable deviation from PM .
Lastly, the reserve price is rational. Note that if one compares the derivatives of Fm and
Fj:
fm =
SrcjPm
µp2
(18)
fj =
(µ+ Srcm)PL
µp2
(19)
Using the facts that Srcm < Srcj and PMSrcj = PL(µ + Srcj) it is easy to see that
fm(p) > fj(p) for any price in (PL, PM). As the distribution of j has a mass point at
the maximal price of PM , the expected value of Fm is smaller than the one of Fj. From
lemma 2.2 in order for the reserve price to be rational E(Fm) needs to be at least PM − c,
which occurs with equality, due to the structure of PM :
E(Fm(p)) =
∫
PL
PMpfm(p) =
SrcjPm
µ
∫
PL
PM
1
p
=
SrcjPm
µ
· ln
(
Srcj + µ
Srcj
)
= Pm − c
(20)
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✷Note that here all sellers but m have the same profit per store and a mass point at PM .
The smallest firm has a larger profit per store, and offers more generous discounts. Also,
additional equilibria may exist where several of the smallest firms after m also mix, but
again, with smaller mass than m. This comes in line with the results pointed out in [1].
The next step is to denote the general structure of NE in such case. It is given in the
theorem below:
Theorem 3 In the case of a unique smallest seller the NE with a reserve price PM of
the game look as follows:
• All sellers with size above nj select the reserve price purely.
• The lowest price in the support union is PL = PM(
Srcj
µ+Srcj
).
• Seller m mixes with a continuous, dense distr. function fm over (PL, PM).
• Some sellers with size nj also mix over the entire interval with a continuous dense
Fj, such that Fj(p) < Fm(p) for all p ∈ (PL, PM), and in addition have a mass point
at PM .
• As in the previous case some sellers with size nj can also select PM purely or have
a cutoff price. The sellers with a cutoff price use the same Fj below the cutoff price.
• All sellers except m have the same profit per store, and m has a higher profit per
store.
The calculation of the equilibrium distribution is done in similar lines to the proposition
4.1
5 Examples
The theorems described how to look for such NE, but without examples it might be harder
to perceive. Here I provide two examples for Asymmetric NE, one for the original Stahl
Model and one for the extended Model. The examples suggest a wide class of NE, where
some sellers select the reserve price purely, whereas all other sellers select the symmetric
NE strategy of the model with the remaining number of searchers.
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5.1 Original Model Example
Consider the Stahl model with 3 sellers and a shoppers fraction of 1/4.
The following asymmetric NE exists:
• The searchers have a reserve price of PM = c/(1− ln2) > c
• One of the sellers offers the reserve price as a pure strategy.
• The other two sellers use an atomless distribution function F (p) = 2 − PM/p on
[PM/2, PM ]
Note that 1/4 is the mass of searchers visiting each of the stores initially.
The pure str. agent receives the profit of PM/4.
Suppose the mixed str. agent selects a price p ∈ [PL, PM). Then, her expected profit
would be:
p(
1− F (p)
4
+
1
4
) =
p
4
(2− F (p)) =
p
4
PM
p
=
PM
4
(21)
Clearly, if the pure str. agent selects a price in (PL, PM) her prob. to sell to shoppers
is (1 − F (p))2 < (1 − F (p), and therefore, such deviation is not profitable. Similarly,
selecting PL would lead to the same profit as selecting PM .
Any agent selecting prices above PM would not sell to anyone, and selecting a price below
PL yields less profit.
One last thing to check is the searcher condition. Sufficient for this would be to check
that the expected price of the mixed str. seller is at least PM − c.
The density function, which is the derivative of the distribution function, is PM/p
2. There-
fore, the expected value is:
E =
∫ PM
PM/2
pf(p) =
∫ PM
PM/2
PM/p = PM(ln(PM/PL)) = PM(ln2) (22)
Thus, the expected price of a mixing seller, E = PM ln2. Since PM(1− ln2) = c, it is easy
to see that PM − E = c, or PM − c = E as required.
If a searcher did not observe the price of PM but a lower one, she know that she had
encountered a mixed price agent. Additional search will yield with prob. 0.5 another
mixed agent with expected price of PM − c, or prob. 0.5 of a pure agent and price PM .
20
Combined - expected price in an additional search is PM − c/2, making the additional
search not profitable after observing a price below PM , due to the search price c.
If a searcher observed a price of PM she know that she encountered a pure str. seller,
and if she searches further she will get the expected price of PM − c. Here the searcher is
indifferent whether to search on or not. Therefore, it is an equilibrium.
5.2 Extended Model Example
I take a similar example to the symmetric model. Again, with 3 sellers, but now only
1/6 are shoppers. 1/2 of the consumers are searchers initially visiting one of the stores,
and 1/6 of the consumers are searchers initially visiting each of the two others. The
corresponding number of stores is, for example, 3, 1, 1.
The following asymmetric NE exists:
• The searchers have a reserve price of PM = c/(1− ln2) > c
• The seller with the larger store number offers the reserve price as a pure strategy.
• The other two sellers use the same atomless distribution function on [PM/2, PM ]
• The distribution function for the two mixing sellers is F (p) = 2− PM/p.
The searchers condition is analogous to the symmetric model, and therefore, the reserve
price would be indeed rational.
One needs to check that no seller wishes to deviate. Firstly, note that prices of above PM
or below PL = PM/2 are not profitable for all sellers. Already at PL there is a prob. 1 to
sell to shoppers and there is no need in a further discount. Prices above PM would cause
a quantity sold to be 0.
The profit for the pure str. seller is PM/2 and for the other two is PM/6 when offering
the price PM .
The profit of the mixed str. seller when she offers a price p ∈ [PL, PM), is as follows:
p(
1
6
+
1− F (p)
6
) =
p
6
(2− 2 +
PM
p
) =
PM
6
(23)
Therefore, the mixing agents are indeed indifferent between the prices in the interval.
21
Lastly, one needs to show that the pure str. agent would not deviate to a lower price. His
profit when offering a lower price p is:
p(
1
2
+
(1− F (p))2
6
) ≤ p(
1
2
+
1− F (p)
6
) < p(
1
2
+
1− F (p)
2
) =
PM
2
(24)
The first inequality due to F (p) being between 0 and 1. The second strict inequality due
to 1− F (p) being strictly positive when p < PM . The third equality is algebraic.
It is clearly visible that the pure str. agent has no incentive to deviate to a different str.,
and therefore it is a NE.
An interesting point to note is that the average seller profit in this example is higher
than in the previous one. Here, the three sellers together receive an expected profit of
(1/2+1/3+1/3)PM = 5/6PM whereas in the previous example they got only 3/4PM . The
reason behind it is simple: more searchers (half of them) bought at the reservation price
in the asymmetric case, in comparison to 1/4 of them in the symmetric case. Clearly, if
all but the smallest sellers offer the high price, the fraction of buyers buying at that price
will be higher.
5.3 Additional Examples
It is possible to construct additional examples for the original model as follows: Add to
a symmetric NE setting an additional seller that charges purely the reserve price. Then,
by adjusting the searchers fractions, similarly to the example provided above a NE will
be obtained. For the extended model exists a NE where the sellers with the lowest store
number ignore the searchers visiting one of the larger sellers and obtain among them a
symmetric (for example) NE, and the other sellers set a pure strategy of PM . The way to
show that the profiles are NE are similar to the way that the examples above were shown,
for example, by having more than one agent selecting the reserve price as a pure strategy,
or a seller having a cutoff price.
6 Discussion
Here is a short discussion over the models and result. first, the structure and economic
motivation on the results is provided. Afterward, a couple of situations are shown where
importance of the extension becomes clear. Then, a couple of empiric tests are suggested
to verify whether the results hold in the lab. Lastly, some points to future research are
suggested.
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6.1 NE Structure
The structure of the NE is in one line with the results in [1] and [8]. There, a single firm
has a larger size, and this firm will charge the reserve price purely. ’However, this paper
suggests a more wide setting and more possibilities for firm sizes. In this extension we see
that indeed larger firms find no incentive to compete on shoppers. The reason behind it
can be seen easily form the profit structure. The profit of seller i is as follows:
pii(p) = pαi(p) + p(1− µ)ni/N (25)
The profit consists of two components - expected profit form shoppers and profit from
searchers. Setting a lower price has two effects - on one side it increases the probability
to attract shoppers, but on the other it reduces the profit from the searchers. Note that
the first, positive, effect is more size independent (probability to be cheapest increases
similarly no matter your size), whereas the second effect is size defendant and is more
significant for larger sellers. Therefore, a larger seller will find it less attractive to offer
discounts. In the case of at least two smallest sellers, these will compete one with the
other, and larger sellers will not even bother to enter the ’shoppers market’, by sticking
to the reserve price. In the case of a unique smallest seller, the competition will be with
some ’second smallest’ sellers, and sellers above that ’second smallest’ size will stay out.
The three types of strategies in the NE have some economic motivation. The mixing seller
wishes to compete over the shoppers when the pure reserve price seller does not to bother
with the shoppers. Those kind of behavior are common in the economic world, and not
in all cases all will compete as predicted by the symmetric NE. If only a single seller
decides to compete, she will have monopolistic profits, which would attract additional
competitors, and therefore, in NE at least two sellers will compete for the shoppers. As
suggested in [1], in the case of a smallest unique seller (their setting is of two seller with
different size), the smaller seller will offer lower prices with higher probability.
The cutoff price is for sellers that do not wish to be bothered with small probabilities.
There are several effects that may cause a seller to refrain from sufficiently low probability
events, for example see [4]. Then, such seller will compete for shoppers, but only at prices
that yield the benefit of getting the shoppers from high enough probability. When the
probability to attract shoppers is lower than this individual threshold, the seller prefers
to refrain from the shoppers market and select the reserve price purely.
These three strategies in addition to the size implication explain the behavior of sellers in
this model.
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Figure 4: Consumers and their initial visit
6.2 Examples
First example uses the data from Table 2 in from [2]. This paper discusses the pricing of
a homogeneous good (milk) in 8 discounters in Hungary over a period of 5 years (2004-
2008). The stores number data was not available in the paper, and current stores number
was obtained (Jan 2012), with two exceptions. One of the supermarket chains, PLUS, was
purchased by another, InterSpar, after the relevant period. Therefore, from the current
number of stores by InterSpar the number of PLUS stores ( 170 stores) was subtracted.
The current number of stores serves as an indicator to the number of stores in the research
period, and is divided into several distinct groups by size. This provides enough insight,
and the idea that smaller chains are usually cheaper. Note that there can be additional
factors (such as location of stores) affecting the price, however, one factor can indeed be
the chain size. The table is as follows:
Chain Name Stores Number in Hungary Avg. price of milk
InterSpar 50-1001 182 HUF
Cora Below 20 198 HUF
Match Below 20 200 HUF
Tesco 200-400 205 HUF
Auchan Below 20 211 HUF
CBA Above 500 213 HUF
Plus2 100-200 230 HUF
COOP Above 500 240 HUF
Another example is from drogerie stores in Germany. GKL3 research found that Schlecker
is 10-20% more expensive than competitors. Additionaly, the number of stores in January
2012 of the various chains in Germany and Europe is given in figure 4. Again we see a
tendency that the largest chain is the more expensive one. Again, additional factors may
have an effect here, but it seems that chain size plays a role when determining prices.
3
Conducted in Jan. 2012, comparing prices in 1700 stores in Germany
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To conclude, it seems that there should be some positive correlation between chain size and
price. An empiric research checking this connection explicitly will be able to determine
how strong it is.
6.3 Empiric tests and Policy Suggestions
The structure of NE allow to run several empiric tests on a database containing pricing
and chain size data. Firstly, sellers may play an asymmetric NE, and the results here
suggest some differences from the classical Stahl Model. Firstly, there will be a higher
probability for reserve price. In any asymmetric NE some sellers select the reserve price
with a mass point. This implies that the reserve price will be more commonly selected.
Similarly, larger discounts will be more rare, as the reserve price will be more common.
When sellers with different size are examined, one should see correlation between chain
size and price. Moreover, in a dynamic setting there should be some price sticking, as
mass points exist.
When examining the probability for a consumer to encounter a lower price, it is clearly
visible that the larger is the variance in store sizes, and the rarer the smallest stores
are, the closer expected price paid is to the reserve price. This is an additional factor to
examine, and it suggests an interesting policy decision. If the regulator wishes to reduce
goods prices, reducing the variance among the selling firms can reduce the price, as exists
a NE where less sellers select the reserve price purely.
6.4 Future Research
The results here open several important questions, which leave place for a fruitful future
research. Firstly, the assumption here is that a reserve price exists. There may be addi-
tional NE without a reserve price, and an interesting question is whether such exist and
how do these look like. This will allow to fully characterize all NE of the model and fully
explain behavior of sellers. An additional question is combined with the determination of
the reserve price. What is the full set of reserve prices under a certain setting, as here
only a lemma provides a sufficient condition for the rationality of it. Moreover, which
reserve price will the consumers set in order to minimize their price. On the other hand
- with which NE should the sellers respond. What is the best NE for sellers and what
is the best NE for consumer, will sellers prefer to mix, or to have a specific cutoff price?
This question of consumer welfare and seller welfare will provide an important insight on
behavior of these groups, and can provide a policy decision for a regulator in order to set
the price lower or higher.
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The Stahl model is a very important tool and the model is being used and applied in
numerous papers. I hope that this paper provides an additional important insight which
will make the Stahl model more applicable and more realistic. Additionally, any of the
further research topics suggested here will provide yet another important block to the
model, and to explaining behavior of consumers and sellers.
A Symmetric Model
Here I show the proof to theorem 1. This is shown in a sequence of lemmas, first dealing
with the regular Stahl model and then dealing with the extended model.
A.1 Mass Points and Highest offered Price
Lemma A.1 There are no mass points at any price that can attract shoppers with positive
prob.
If at price q there is a mass point by a single seller i, price just above it is strictly less
profitable for all others, and therefore would not be selected, as there the chance to attract
shoppers drops discontinuously. Thus, seller i can set the mass point higher and gain more
profit. In the case of mass points by several sellers at price p undercutting is possible,
which probability to attract shoppers discontinuously. Therefore, there are no mass points
at prices that can attract shoppers. ✷
Lemma A.2 All sellers select PM as the supremum point of their strategy support.
From lemma 2.1 it cannot be higher than PM .
Suppose that the supremum price of seller i is p < PM . For any price above p and below
PM the probability to sell to shoppers is 0. Therefore, in equilibrium no seller would select
a price in (p, PM). Additionally, suppose that seller i has the lowest support supremum.
All sellers cannot have a mass point at p, as in such case undercutting would be profitable.
From previous lemma seller i has no mass point at price p. Thus, probability to sell to
shoppers at price p is 0, for all other shoppers, and no other seller would have a mass point
at this price. Therefore, a deviation exists to seller i, where i selects prices arbitrarily
close to PM instead of prices arbitrarily close to p is profitable. ✷
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Remark A.1 Note that this implies equal profit to all sellers in any equilibrium, or all
but one have equal and one higher.
If at least two sellers do not have a mass point at PM the probability that shoppers buy
at PM is 0. Moreover, if only one seller has no mass point at PM she has weakly higher
profit than all other sellers.
The two lemmas combined imply that there can be no mass points at any price except
for PM .
A.2 Single Interval and Profit Equivalence
Definition A.1 Let αi(p) be denoted as the probability that p is the cheapest price, if
seller i selects it. Explicitly: what is the probability of seller i to sell to shoppers given she
selects price p. As the distribution is atomless except (maybe) PM , one can define αi(p)
as the product of ’Probability that seller j sets price above p’, which is denoted as βj(p).
Formally:
βj(p) = 1− Fj(p) (26)
αj(p) =
∏
j 6=i
βj(p) (27)
Lemma A.3 Exists an interval I such that the union of the seller strategies is contained
in I and dense in it.
Suppose exists an interval [a, b] (a < b < PM) such that sellers select prices only below a
and above b, and exist prices both below a and above b. Let p− be the highest price below
a that is in the support union of the sellers. A seller can deviate from p− and prices just
below it to b, and sellers arbitrarily close to all of her previous quantity:
The searchers behavior does not change, as the prices are below PM . Since the probability
for someone to select a price just below p is arbitrarily small, the decrease in probability
to sell to shoppers is arbitrarily small.
The profit form raising the price is much higher than such arbitrarily small loss, as it is at
least (b− p)(1 − µ)/n, as the searchers pay strictly more after the deviation. Therefore,
if the support is not continuous there is a profitable deviation. ✷
Corollary A.1 Exists an interval I = [PL, PM ], such that any NE strategy profile the
sellers randomize continuously over I, and possibly some sellers set mass points at PM .
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Lemma A.4 The previous lemma holds also for two sellers. Meaning - any interval has
a non empty intersection with the support of at least two sellers.
Suppose that all points in an interval [p, p′] (p <′ p < PM) are selected at most by one
seller. Additionally, from previous lemma this seller needs to have in support the entire
interval. Than exists a profitable deviation for her would be to set a mass point at p′
instead of selecting the original distribution over the interval. ✷
Corollary A.2 Any interval between PL and PM has points in the support of at least two
sellers.
Lemma A.5 All sellers have the same profit.
The only case that needed to be shown is as follows: If n− 1 sellers have the same profit,
the other seller cannot have a profit above them. It was shown before that if at least two
sellers do not have mass points at PM all sellers have equal profit. If only one seller has
no mass point at PM then she must have a higher profit. This is since she can always
deviate to a pure strategy offering PM .
Suppose seller i is the only seller who does not offer a mass point at PM . Let pi be the
lowest (infimum if needed) price in the support of i. As it has a higher profit than all
other players this price cannot be the lowest price in the support union. Note that due
to previous lemmas seller i sets no mass point at pi, Fi(pi) = 0. If no seller selects a price
below pi then it is not possible for seller i to have a higher profit than other sellers, as
other sellers could get the same profit as i gets with pi. Denote a seller j 6= i, and examine
the profits of seller i and j. As noted before, pii > pi(j).
The profit of seller i offering pi is (remember all searchers visit exactly one store):
pii(pi) = pi((1− Fj(p)
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− Fk(pi))µ+ (1− µ)/n) (28)
The profit of seller j:
pij(pi) = pi((1− Fi(p)
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− Fk(pi))µ+ (1− µ)/n) (29)
Since 0 = Fi(pi) ≤ Fj(pi) the profit of j when offering pi is weakly higher than the profit
of i when offering pi. This contradicts the fact that seller i must have a higher profit than
seller j. ✷
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I have shown that the support union is equal to some interval I. Let PL be the lowest
price in this interval. As the mixing sellers need to be indifferent between all the strategies
they mix one can say that:
PL =
(1− µ)/n
µ+ (1− µ)/n
PM (30)
Clearly, the searchers do not search at this price, as PL is the cheapest price that can exist
in EQ. Additionally, when a seller selects this price she is certain to sell to shoppers.
A.3 Symmetry
In this subsection I will discuss the symmetries in the NE distribution functions, and see
where they can differ.
Lemma A.6 The following inequality needs to be satisfied for any p ∈ (PL, PM):
p(αi(p)µ+
1− µ
n
) ≤ PM(
1− µ
n
) (31)
If it is strictly larger than price p will be more profitable than PM , which due to previous
lemmas cannot occur in NE. Moreover, if seller i selects price p there must be an equality,
as the profit i gets from any price she selects has to be equal to PM(
1−µ
n
). ✷
The following observation will be crucial in understanding the asymmetric NE:
Corollary A.3 Only the seller(s) with the maximal α among the sellers may select the
corresponding price.
Note that since there are no mass points α and β change continuously, except possibly at
PM . Note that at PM the α of each seller approaches 0 continuously as PM is approached,
as the probability to sell to shoppers with price PM is 0. Adding the fact that there are
no mass points below PM , it is clear that α a continuous function.
Lemma A.7 Let I be an open interval in [PL, PM ]. Suppose that seller i selects a price
in I with some positive probability. Let j be a different seller. Then, also seller j must
select a price from I with same positive probability, or not to select any prices in or above
the interval I, except PM .
From previous lemma it is known that each interval is selected by at least two sellers, and
done so without mass points. Note that the only way to select elements continuously is
to select a dense subset of an interval.
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Assume that seller i sets a positive probability to a dense subset of I = (p′, p∗), whereas
seller j does not select any prices in this interval. Let p ∈ I.
Note that βi is strictly decreasing in the neighborhood of p, and βj remains constant there.
This is since i select prices in the neighborhood of p and j not.
Note that from the definition it is known that αi/βj = αj/βi. Since βi is decreasing and
βj, and conclude that αj is decreasing more rapidly then αi.
Therefore, for any price p ∈ I, the ratio of the parameters is αi(p) > αj(p), except maybe
the infimum of the interval.
Similarly, if both i and j do not select prices in an interval then αi and αj decrease in
such interval at the same rate.
Let pˆ be the infimum of an interval that is to the right of I, and is selected by j. For pˆ,
the α parameters need to satisfy αj(p) ≥ αi(p). If both select this price - equality, if only
j does so - weak inequality.
Note that at p the opposite inequality holds, and in all points between p and pˆ, the
parameter βj is decreasing less than βi. Since all the α’s and β’s change continuously
everywhere except PM , it is the case that j cannot offer such prices.
Concluding, if a seller does not select an interval within [PL, PM) she would not select any
price above it, except possibly PM , where the equation holds due to zero probability to
sell to shoppers. ✷
As shown in Lemma 2.2, for the reserve price to make sense, the following condition is
sufficient: The expected price of a seller is at least PL − c.
Combining the lemmas the theorem 1 is obtained.
B Asymmetric Model Proofs
In this section I deal with the extended model and provide the results for the case when
the smallest seller is not unique. Namely, this appendix shows the proof for theorem 2-
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B.1 Similarity to old model
The following lemmas carry over to this model with the same proof as before. The results
in this subsection will be valid also for the single smallest firm case.
Lemma B.1 No seller offers a price above PM in NE.
Corollary B.1 Each searcher buys at the first store she visits.
Lemma B.2 All sellers select PM as the supremum point of their strategy support.
Lemma B.3 There are no mass points except possibly PM
Lemma B.4 Exists an interval I such that the union of the seller strategies is contained
in I and dense in it.
Corollary B.2 Exists an interval I = [PL, PM ], such that any NE strategy profile the
sellers randomize continuously over I, and possibly some sellers set mass points at PM .
Lemma B.5 The previous lemma holds also for two sellers. Meaning - any interval has
a point in distribution of at least two sellers.
Corollary B.3 Any interval between PL and PM has points in the support of at least two
sellers.
B.2 Asymmetric Model Results
However once one start dealing with the profits a difference exists:
Let the profit divided by the searchers fraction be denoted as the ’Profit per Branch’
(PPB), and denote it as pˆi. The PPB measures the profit the seller gets divided by her
store number.
Lemma B.6 All sellers have the same PPB. That is, pii
ni
is equal to all sellers.
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Similarly to the previous case, all sellers who have a mass point at PM have the probability
of 0 to sell to shoppers at that price. This is since in any NE, due to undercutting, at
least one seller will not have a mass point at that price and will select lower prices w.p.
1. Therefore PPB for sellers with a mass point at PM will be:
pˆi = pi/ni = PM(1− µ)/N (32)
Similarly, that would be the PPB if PM does not attract shoppers w.p.1.
Similarly to the symmetric model the only additional case that needed to be shown is: If
n− 1 sellers have the same PPB, the other seller cannot have a profit above them. Note
that if only one seller has no mass point at PM then she must have a weakly higher PPB,
as she can always deviate a strategy with a mass point at PM .
Suppose seller i is the only seller who does not offer a mass point at PM . Let pi be the
lowest (infimum if needed) price in the support of i. Additionally, seller j with nj ≤ ni.
Since the lowest ni is not unique (from assumption) such j always exists.
The profit of seller i offering pi is (remember all searchers visit exactly one store):
pii(pi) = pi((1− Fj(p)
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− Fk(pi))µ+ (1− µ)ni/N) (33)
The profit of seller j:
pij(pi) = pi((1− Fi(p)
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− Fk(pi))µ+ (1− µ)nj/N) (34)
If one calculates the PPB for the two sellers, it will be equal to:
pii =
pi((1− Fj(p)
∏
k 6=i,j(1− Fk(pi))µ
ni
+ pi (35)
pij =
pi((1− Fi(p)
∏
k 6=i,j(1− Fk(pi))µ
nj
+ pi (36)
And since 0 = Fi(pi) ≤ Fj(pi) one gets that the expression in the nominator of pij is
weakly higher than the of pii.
Combined with the fact that ni ≥ nj , it is clear that PPB of seller j is weakly higher,
which is a contradiction. ✷
Let PL be the lowest price seller i can offer, while obtaining the PPB of PM . PL needs to
satisfy:
PL(µ/ni + (1− µ)/N) = PM(1− µ)/N) (37)
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Note that PL is increasing in ni. The point in this is only the sellers with the lowest
store number will actually select a price at which they will sell to shoppers with certainty.
Others will join in at a higher price, when the probability to attract shoppers is smaller
than 1.
As before let αi(p) be the probability of seller i to sell to shoppers when offering price p.
Similarly to the identical sellers case, in order for seller i to have the PPB of PM each
price p needs to satisfy:
p(µαi(p)/ni + (1− µ)/N) ≤ PM(1− µ)/N (38)
As before, only seller with the highest α/n (α divided by the stores number) at a price
will select it.
Lemma B.7 Suppose seller i has an interval I in his support, and seller j does not. This
implies that in the support of seller j there are no prices above I except PM .
This lemma is similar to the one in the symmetric case, however here it has stronger
implications as the PL differs between sellers.
As before, the probability to attract shoppers is as follows:
αi(p) = (1− Fj(p))
∏
k 6=i,j
(1− Fk(p)) (39)
If one compares the PPB of seller i and seller j:
αi(p)
ni
= (1− Fj(p))
∏
k 6=i,j(1− Fk(p))
ni
(40)
αj(p)
nj
= (1− Fi(p))
∏
k 6=i,j(1− Fk(p))
nj
(41)
And it is known that the first is weakly larger than the second, as only the highest α/n
can have the price in support. This implies that:
(1− Fj(p))
ni
≥
(1− Fi(p))
nj
(42)
It is shown that in I, seller i has the highest α/n. Assume that exists a price p which
is the lowest price above i selected by seller j. This implies that at price p′ < PM seller
j has the maximal α/n. Note that since the prices between I and p were not selected,
Fj(p
′) = Fj(p) as j does not select prices in between. Fi however, had increased in I, it
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is known that seller i has some mass over I. This implies that the inequality above holds
also for p′, as an element on the right hand side was decreased, and at p′ it holds strictly:
(1− Fj(p
′))
ni
>
(1− Fi(p
′))
nj
(43)
Remark B.1 The reason that the result holds for prices below PM is that in the course
of the proof a division by
∏
k 6=i,j(1− Fk(p)) was applied, and it needs to be positive. This
happens at any price below PM .
The inequality above implies that seller j cannot select the price p′, as seller i has a higher
α/n, for p < PM . Thus, if seller j does not select some interval in the support union, she
will not select any price above it except possibly PM . ✷
Corollary B.4 In any NE of the game, all sellers that do not have the lowest store
number will select PM as a pure strategy. This is since such sellers cannot offer the price
PL with sufficiently high PPB.
Combining the lemmas the proof of theorem 2 is obtained.
C Single Smallest Firm
In this section I provide the proof for theorem 3
As before the smallest store number of a seller is denoted as nm, and is the parameter of
seller m. The next smallest size is denoted nj and is the parameter of seller j.
Here I deal with the extended model, and the case that a unique single firm exists. Thus,
I provide here the required steps to the proof of theorem 3. The lemmas in section B.1
hold with the same proof. The first difference occurs when dealing with PPB, and it is as
follows:
Lemma C.1 In any NE the PPB of all sellers except m is equal to PM
1−µ
N
. The PPB of
seller m is strictly higher. Additionally, all sellers except m have mass points at PM .
The lowest price in the support union and denoted PL.
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PPB (profit per branch) of seller i is the profit of seller i divided by the ni, which is a
constant for a given seller.
Similarly to the previous case, some sellers mix, and at least two have at the support the
price of PL, where some seller i 6= m is one of those. Comparing PPB of sellers i and m
yield the following equations:
PPBi = PL(µ/ni + (1− µ)/N) (44)
PPBm = PL(µ/nm + (1− µ)/N) (45)
Since nm < ni from definition, it is clear that if m offers this price she will have a higher
PPB. This implies that if m offers PL then she must have a higher PPB than all other
sellers.
If m does not offer PL, she can deviate to PL and increase her profit. Therefore, the PPB
of seller m is strictly larger than the PPB of some other sellers.
As the support supremum of all sellers is PM , one of the two cases must hold (if all have
mass points at PM undercutting is possible):
• At least two sellers do not have a mass point at PM
• A single seller does not have a mass point at PM
In the first case all have equal PPB, as all offer the price PM and by this price attract no
shoppers, having the PPB of PM(1−µ)/N . In the second case, all but one seller have the
mentioned PPB, when the last seller have a weakly higher one. From the previous steps
it is known that the second case holds, and the seller without a mass point at PM is seller
m, and she has the highest PPB. ✷.
From lemma B.7, only sellers with nj can have prices below PM in support. As at least
two sellers need to mix over the entire interval, and sellers with nj, and all sellers except
m have the same PPB, all the sellers with parameter nj can mix over the entire interval,
have a cutoff price or select the reserve price purely. Additionally, when mixing the same
distr. must be used. Note that at least one of the sellers, denoted j, must mix over the
entire interval, as the support must be covered by at least two sellers.
The last point needed to be show is that m has higher probability to offer discount.
Namely, Fj < Fm in (PL, PM). Remember that:
αi(p) =
∏
k 6=i
(1− Fk(p) =
∏
(1− Fk(p))
1− Fi(p)
(46)
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Therefore, the larger α will have the larger F . If one writes the profit expressions for the
sellers j and m:
pim(p) = p(αm(p) +
nm(1− µ)
N
) = PL
(
µ+
nm(1− µ)
N
)
(47)
pim(p) = p(αj(p) +
nj(1− µ)
N
) = PM
(
nj(1− µ)
N
)
(48)
For simplicity, I denote Srci = (1− µ)ni/N
Extracting the expressions for αm and αj the following equation is obtained:
αm =
(PL − p)Srcm + PLµ
pµ
(49)
αj =
PM − p
pµ
Srcj (50)
Obtaining the derivatives and comparing, one gets that αm > αj for prices in (PL, PM),
as required.
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